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THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE JUDICIAL POWER 
 
Randy E. Barnett* 
 
This Constitution defines the extent of the powers of the general government. If 
the general legislature should at any time overleap their limits, the judicial 
department is a constitutional check. If the United States go beyond their 
powers, if they make a law which the Constitution does not authorize, it is void; 
and the judicial power, the national judges, who, to secure their impartiality, are 
to be made independent, will declare it to be void. On the other hand, if the 
states go beyond their limits, if they make a law which is a usurpation upon the 
general government, the law is void; and upright, independent judges will 
declare it to be so.1 
Oliver Elsworth (1788) 
 
The evidence seems to indicate that the Framers did not mean for the Supreme 
Court to have authority to void acts of Congress.2 
Leonard Levy (1988) 
 
 
In the two hundred years between Oliver Elsworth’s speech to the 
Connecticut ratification convention and the statement by the deservedly well-
respected historian Leonard Levy, doubts developed in some quarters concerning 
the legitimacy of judicial reviewg—doubts I hear expressed wherever I speak on 
the Constitution.  The origin of these doubts appears to lay at the feet of some 
distinguished legal writers and historians.  In addition to Leonard Levy, similar 
denials or skepticism have been expressed by such well-known legal figures as 
Charles Beard, William Crosskey, Learned Hand, Charles Hyneman, Jesse 
Choper, and William Nelson.  Although I believe that many constitutional 
scholars today do not share their views, there exists no definitive originalist 
refutation of the claim that judicial review was invented by Chief Justice John 
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, a claim that has, over the years, crept into the 
                                                          
* Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of Law [rbarnett@bu.edu].  A revised 
version of the material presented here will appear  in RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (Princeton, forthcoming).  I extend my thanks to 
Kate McFarland for her research assistance in the preparation of this article.  Permission to 
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1 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 196 (J.B. Lippincott, 1859) [hereinafter ELLIOT DEBATES] 
(Oliver Elsworth in the Connecticut ratification convention January 7, 1788). 
2 LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 100 (1988). 
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legal consciousness and law school classrooms.3 
In this article, I intend to lay to rest any doubt that, at the founding, the 
judicial power of the United States included the power of judicial rzeview.  I hope 
to refute any claims that judicial review was invented in Marbury v. Madison, or 
that, because it is contrary to the original meaning of the Constitution, it must be 
justified by some nonoriginalist interpretive methodology.  I will do so, not by 
discerning the shadowy and often counterfactual “intentions” of the founding 
generation, but by presenting as comprehensively as I can what the founders 
actually said during the constitutional convention and in state ratification 
conventions, and immediately after ratification.  These statements, taken 
cumulatively, leave no doubt that the founders contemplated judicial nullification 
of legislation enacted by the states and by Congress.  In short, I shall demonstrate 
once and for all that the original meaning of the “judicial power” in Article I, 
includes the power of judicial nullification.at least is 4 
 
I.  THE SOURCE OF THE CONTROVERSY 
 
Most people today assume that judges are authorized by the Constitution 
to declare statutes unconstitutional. Yet the Constitution does not seem to grant 
this power expressly. Article III says: “The judicial Power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such Courts as Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish.” In sharp contrast with the presidential veto 
power,5 nowhere in the Constitution does it say explicitly that the “Supreme 
Court, and such inferior courts as may be established by Congress, shall have 
power to nullify a Law enacted by Congress and signed by the President if the 
Law is unconstitutional.” 
The absence of a clearly expressed grant of power has moved some critics 
of judicial review to question its legitimacy. One of these, Charles Hyneman, 
argued that the Constitution “expressly endows the president with powers to 
restrain Congress and the judiciary,” and it “expressly endows Congress with 
powers enabling it to check the president and the judiciary.”6 Nevertheless, “it 
contains no provision which asserts that the Supreme Court or any other court 
may exercise a specific power which would restrain the president or Congress in 
                                                          
3 See, e.g. Shawn Gunnarson, Using History to Reshape the Discussion of Judicial Review, 1994 
B.Y.U.L. REV. 151, 152 (1994) (“A conventional interpretation of Marbury is that the Supreme 
Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Marshall, invented judicial review without supporting 
precedent or significant historical antecedent.”).   
4 How is this for rhetoric likely to induce both citations and attempted refutations by others? 
5 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“Every Bill… shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the 
President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his 
Objections to the House in which it shall have originated…). 
6 CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL 125 (1963). 
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the exercise of their powers.”7 Hyneman contended that the most reasonable 
inference to draw from the “silence about a restraining power” for the judiciary is 
that the courts “should not exercise significant restraint on the other two”8 
departments.   
Hyneman was not alone.  Apart from Leonard Levy, he was joined in his 
skepticism (in chronological order) by such writers as H.L. Boudin (1911): 
“There is absolutely no evidence whatever of an intention on the part of [the 
constitutional convention] to invest the judiciary with any sort of control over 
federal legislation, or over state legislation in matters admittedly within the 
legislative competence of the states.”9  Charles Beard (1912): “The direct 
intention of the framers and enactors not being clearly expressed on this point, we 
may have recourse to the reason and spirit of the Constitution.”10  Learned Hand 
(1958):  “In spite of authority which I am certainly not qualified to challenge, I 
cannot, however, help doubting whether the evidence justifies a certain 
conclusion that the Convention would have so voted, if the issue had been put to it 
that courts should have power to invalidate acts of Congress.”11 William 
Crosskey: “The rationally indicated conclusion is that judicial review of 
congressional acts was not intended, or provided, in the Constitution.”12   
More recently doubts have been expressed by Jesse Choper (1980): 
“Whether the framers originally intended to vest the Supreme Court with such an 
extensive authority has been the subject of powerful and painstaking scholarship. . 
. . The reported evidence appears—at least to a nonhistorian who has not carefully 
culled it for himself—to be inconclusive.”13 Alexander M. Bickel (1986): “At 
worst it may be said that the intentions of the Framers cannot be ascertained with 
finality; that there were some who thought this and some that, and that it will 
never be entirely clear just exactly where the collective judgment—which alone is 
decisive—came to rest.  In any debate over the force of tradition, such is the most 
that can be said against the claims of judicial review.”14 William Nelson (2000): 
“What makes [Marbury] even more important is the absence of any clear plan on 
                                                          
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 H.L. Boudin, 26 Polit. Sc. Qtly. 238, 248 (1911); see also id. (“There is ample historical proof 
that, whatever the hope of some, from the complete silence of the document, as to possible future 
development- the great majority of the framers never suspected that a general power of the 
judiciary to control legislation could be interpreted into the new Constitution.  They evidently 
assumed that such an extraordinary power could not be exercised unless expressly granted.”). 
10 CHARLES BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 76 (1912). 
11 LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 7 (1958). 
12 WILLIAM CROSSKEY, 2 POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1000 (1953). 
13JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 62-63 (1980).   
14 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1986). 
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the part of the Constitution’s framers to provide the Court with this power.”15 
While all these prominent scholars have certainly influenced the legal 
culture, were they right? While virtually all constitutional scholars accept gthe 
legitimacy of judicial review, there has developed a veritable cottage industry in 
in producing defenses of the practice. My purpose is not to rehearse all (or any) of 
these defenses here. Few of these elaborate analyses would have been necessary, 
however, if the Constitution contained words whose plain meaning made it 
irresistibly clear that courts may declare acts of Congress unconstitutional. The 
absence of this plain language provides an opening for Hyneman et. al. to dismiss 
such “inferences” as depending “too much on imagination, too little on the plain 
meaning of plain words.”16 And it leads some to rest the justification for judicial 
review on highly contestable nonoriginalist interpretive techniques. 
Also contributing to the controversy is confusion and disagreement about 
originalism itself.  Some of these skeptics may have been led to their conclusions 
by their efforts to discern the original intentions of the founders.  Given that they 
involve inquiries into the often hidden and conflicting subjective intentions of 
myriad people who lived a long time ago, a single prevailing “original intention” 
is often notoriously difficult to establish beyond dispute.  In contrast, I have 
defended elsewhere the need to look at the original public meaning given the text 
of the Constitution at the time of the founding, rather than the intentions of those 
who wrote or ratified it.17 
A unique or dominant original public meaning is much easier to discern 
from the historical record so many of the well-known practical difficulties of 
originalism abate if not disappear with this version.  As important, so too do the 
normative objections to originalism.  Original meaning originalism need not reast 
on any appeal to the authority of long-dead framers.  Rather originalism is based 
on the fact the Constitution is an effort to place rules and restrictions on 
lawmakers and enforcers; that the Constitution was put in writing to better 
preserve these restrictions; that purpose for putting these restrictions in writing 
would largely vanish if lawmakers (or judges) could change the rules by which 
laws are made.  Hence, originalism is justified because we, right here and right 
now, are or profess to be committed to a written constitution.  And the meaning of 
a written constitution should remain the same until it is properly changed.  This 
last proposition is all that original meaning originalism amounts to.  
Original meaning interpretation is not always sufficient to yield a rule of 
                                                          
15 WILLIAM NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 
(2000). 
16 HYNEMAN, supra note 6, at 124. 
17 See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOYOLA L. REV. 611 (1999).  I 
expand the normative justification for this approach, and better explain how it works in RANDY E. 
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, chapters 4 & 5. 
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law to apply to a case or controversy.  When the Constitution’s provisions are 
relatively abstract, there is room for, indeed an imperative to, construe the 
Constitution in a manner that does not conflict with the original meaning of what 
the Constitution does say.  In other words, where the original meaning of the 
Constitution is underdeterminate, constitutional construction is needed to provide 
sufficient determinacy to decide a case, provided that any such construction is 
consistent with the original meaning of the text.   
While some originalists would use the original intentions of the framers or 
ratifiers to provide specificity, others would look to tradition and history as it has 
developed since the founding.  Unlike original meaning interpretation, neither of 
these techniques of construction is mandated by a commitment to a written 
constitution.  Elsewhere I explain at greater length the distinction between 
interpretation and construction and argue that underdeterminate text should be 
construed in a manner that enhances the qualities that render the Constitution 
legitimate.18  All that is important for present purposes, however, is to note that 
original meaning provides a frame within which choices must be made in the 
form of supplementation of abstract textual provisions by constitutional 
construction.  . 
With this approach to originalist interpretation (and its limits) in mind, the 
overwhelming majority of courts and scholars are correct, I submit, to accept the 
legitimacy of judicial review.  Judicial nullification of unconstitutional laws is not 
only consistent with the frame provided by original meaning, it is expressly 
authorized by the text and it therefore entirely justified wholly on originalist 
grounds.  Hyneman and other dissenters are wrong, therefore, to reject its 
historical pedigree. Hyneman does not consider evidence that the original 
meaning of the “judicial power” found in Article III was more specific than what 
today is its plain meaning and that, at the founding, it included a power of judicial 
nullification. If this is established by the weight of the evidence of usage, then 
some power of judicial review would be justified by an originalist interpretation 
even if it is not within today’s “plain meaning” of the text.  In this regard, the 
“dead” constitution provides a better foundation for judicial review than the 
ordinary meaning given its words today. 
 
II.  THE “JUDICIAL POWER” INCLUDED THE POWER OF NULLIFICATION 
 
Far more evidence exists to suggest that the original public meaning of the 
                                                          
18 See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, chapters 4 & 5.  For a 
discussion of the distinction between interpretation and construction see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, & JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 
(1999).  For an examination of what I mean by “legitimacy,” see Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional 
Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (2003). 
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term “judicial power” included the power to nullify unconstitutional legislation 
than even many constitutional scholars who acknowledge its pedigree realize.  In 
this section I present the evidence to be found in the records of the Constitutional 
Convention, in the ratification conventions, and in some of the controversies and 
writings that immediately followed ratification.  The evidence in these sources is 
remarkably uniform. 
 
A.  Evidence from the Constitutional Convention 
 
 Several members of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia 
explicitly assumed that the power to nullify unconstitutional legislation resided in 
the judiciary even before they settled on the particular wording of the various 
clauses. Several statements were made in the context of a proposed power of 
Congress to nullify state laws.  Roger Sherman of Connecticut argued that a such 
a power was “unnecessary, as the Courts of the States would not consider as valid 
any law contravening the Authority of the Union...”19 James Madison of Virginia 
favored such a negative because states “will accomplish their injurious objects 
before they can be . . . set aside by the National Tribunals.”20 He then cited the 
example of Rhode Island, where “the Judges who refused to execute an 
unconstitutional law were displaced, and others substituted, by the 
Legislature….”21 Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania argued that the legislative 
negative was unnecessary because “A law that ought to be negatived will be set 
aside in the Judiciary department.”22 No one in this discussion disputed the power 
of the judiciary to set aside unconstitutional laws passed by states. 
Nor did anyone question that federal judges would have the same power to 
set aside unconstitutional legislation from Congress.  Much is made by critics of 
judicial review of the Convention’s rejection of the proposed council of revision, 
inferring from this refusal an intention of the framers that the judiciary defer to 
legislative will. They rarely mention, however, that the most discussed and 
influential reason for rejecting the council of revision proposal was the existence 
of a judicial negative on unconstitutional legislation. So powerful is this and other 
evidence that it strongly supports the conclusion that judicial nullification was 
included within the original public meaning of the “judicial power.” 
During a debate concerning whether judges should be included with the 
executive in a council empowered to revise laws, the comments of several 
delegates revealed their assumption that federal judges had the inherent power to 
                                                          
19 JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787; 304 (Norton 
1987) [hereinafter NOTES OF DEBATES] (statement of R. Sherman). 
20 Id. (statement of J. Madison). 
21 Id. at 305. 
22 Id. (statement of G. Morris). 
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hold federal laws unconstitutional. Luther Martin of Maryland stated that “as to 
the Constitutionality of laws, that point will come before the Judges in their 
proper official character. In this character they have a negative on the laws.”23 
George Mason of Virginia observed that “in their expository capacity of Judges 
they would have one negative…. They could declare an unconstitutional law 
void.”24 While he favored the idea of the council, James Wilson of Pennsylvania 
conceded that there “was weight in this observation” that “the Judges, as 
expositors of the Laws would have an opportunity of defending their 
constitutional rights.”25 
The assumption that judges possess the inherent power to nullify 
unconstitutional laws crops up in a variety of other contexts during the 
Convention. For example, Gouverneur Morris favored ratification of the 
Constitution by the people in convention because legislative ratification of the 
new Constitution was prohibited by the terms of the Articles of Confederation. 
“Legislative alterations not conformable to the federal compact, would clearly not 
be valid. The Judges would consider them as null & void.”26 James Madison 
argued that a difference between a league or confederation among states and a 
constitution was precisely its status as binding law on judges. “A law violating a 
treaty ratified by a pre-existing law, might be respected by the Judges as a law, 
though an unwise or perfidious one. A law violating a constitution established by 
the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null & void.”27 
Hugh Williamson of North Carolina argued that an express prohibition on ex post 
facto laws by states “may do good here, because the Judges can take hold of it.”28 
What is striking in light of these statements is that, throughout the duration 
of the Convention, I could find no one who disputed the existence of a judicial 
power to nullify unconstitutional laws. No one.  Still, the fact that judicial 
nullification was taken as given by all members of the Constitutional Convention 
does not mean everyone liked this power. John Mercer of Maryland said he 
“disapproved of the Doctrine that the Judges as expositors of the Constitution 
should have authority to declare a law void.”29 Instead he “thought laws ought to 
be well and cautiously made, and then to be uncontroulable.”30 But Mercer’s was 
a lone voice. Even John Dickenson of Delaware who “was strongly impressed 
with the remark of Mr. Mercer as to the power of the Judges to set aside the 
                                                          
23 Id. at 340 (statement of L. Martin). 
24 Id. (statement of G. Mason). 
25 Id. at 336-37 (statement of J. Wilson). 
26 Id. at 351 (statement of G. Morris). 
27 Id. at 352-53 (statement of J. Madison). 
28 Id. at 511 (statement of H. Williamson). 
29 Id. at 462 (statement of J. Mercer). 
30 Id. 
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law,”31 said he “was at the same time at a loss to know what expedient to 
substitute.”32 Gouverneur Morris took issue with Mercer more sharply, stating 
that he could not agree that the judiciary “should be bound to say that a direct 
violation of the Constitution was law. A control over the legislature might have its 
inconveniences. But view the danger on the other side.”33 
The principal criticism of judicial nullification was not its existence but its 
weakness. Some framers were not sanguine about the ability of courts to stand up 
for constitutional principle when necessary. James Wilson thought that Congress 
should have the power to nullify state laws because “[t]he firmness of Judges is 
not itself sufficient.”34  Moreover, he argued (in words that assume a judicial 
power to declare “improper” laws unconstitutional35) that it “would be better to 
prevent the passage of an improper law, than to declare it void when passed.”36 
Despite this concern, a congressional negative on state laws along with the 
council of revision was rejected by the Convention, leaving the other structural 
constraints, including the doctrine of judicial nullification, to keep state and 
national governments from exceeding their proper powers. 
Although I contend that we are not bound by the original intentions of the 
framers, their expressions of intention are evidence of the original public meaning 
of the “judicial power.” Drafters typically strive to choose words whose public 
meaning reflects their intentions. This evidence of framers’ intentions should also 
quiet the concerns of those originalists who do care about that intent. More 
pointedly, originalists who oppose judicial review must abandon original intent 
originalism because the evidence of such intent is overwhelming. They would 
also have to disregard the evidence that suggests that the original public meaning 
of “judicial power” at the time of ratification included judicial review. For the fact 
that judges were to be empowered to nullify unconstitutional legislation was no 
secret intention held only by delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 
Philadelphia.   
 
B.  Evidence from the State Ratification Conventions 
 
The state ratification debates are replete with assertions of the power of 
judicial nullification. Supporters of the Constitution offered this power as a means 
of limiting the powers of the general government. Speaking to the Pennsylvania 
convention, James Wilson stated: “If a law should be made inconsistent with 
                                                          
31 Id. at 463 (statement of J. Dickenson). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. (statement of G. Morris). 
34 Id. at 518 (statement of J. Wilson). 
35 A point I stress in Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, __ U. Pa. J. Con. Law ___  (forthcoming). 
36 NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 18, at 518. (statement of J. Wilson). 
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those powers vested by this instrument in Congress, the judges, as a consequence 
of their independence, and the particular powers of government being defined, 
will declare such law to be null and void; for the power of the Constitution 
predominates. Any thing, therefore, that shall be enacted by Congress contrary 
thereto, will not have the force of law.”37 To the objection that judges would “be 
impeached, because they decide an act null and void, that was made in defiance of 
the Constitution,” Wilson replied: “What House of Representatives would dare to 
impeach, or Senate to commit, judges for the performance of their duty?” 
In the Virginia convention, future chief justice John Marshall openly 
stated the principle of nullification he would later enunciate (and then expand 
upon) in Marbury v. Madison.  If the government of the United States “were to 
make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated,” said Marshall, “it 
would be considered by the judges as an infringement of the Constitution which 
they are to guard. They would not consider such a law as coming under their 
jurisdiction. They would declare it void.”38 
This article began by quoting Oliver Elsworth’s ringing endorsement in 
the Connecticut convention of the judicial power to nullify unconstitutional acts 
of both Congress and state legislatures which is worth repeating here: 
 
This Constitution defines the extent of the powers of the general government. If 
the general legislature should at any time overleap their limits, the judicial 
department is a constitutional check. If the United States go beyond their 
powers, if they make a law which the Constitution does not authorize, it is void; 
and the judicial power, the national judges, who, to secure their impartiality, are 
to be made independent, will declare it to be void. On the other hand, if the 
states go beyond their limits, if they make a law which is a usurpation upon the 
general government, the law is void; and upright, independent judges will 
declare it to be so..39  
 
The power of the federal judiciary to strike down unconstitutional state 
laws was also asserted in the North Carolina convention by William Davie, who 
stated that “Every member will agree that the positive regulations ought to be 
carried into execution, and that the negative restrictions ought not to [be] 
disregarded or violated. Without a judiciary, the injunctions of the Constitution 
may be disobeyed, and the positive regulations neglected or contravened.”40 He 
then argued that should states impose duties on imported goods, “the Constitution 
might be violated with impunity, if there were no power in the general 
                                                          
37 ELLIOT DEBATES, supra note 1, at 2:489. (James Wilson in the Pennsylvania ratification 
convention December 4, 1788). 
38 Id. at 3:553 (John Marshall in the Virginia ratification convention, June 20, 1788). 
39 Id. at 2:196 (Oliver Elsworth in the Connecticut ratification convention, January 7, 1788) 
(emphasis added). 
40 Id. at 4:156 (July 29, 1788). 
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government to correct and counteract such laws. This great object can only be 
safely and completely obtained by the instrumentality of the federal judiciary.”41 
Even opponents of the Constitution conceded the existence of judicial 
nullification, though as at the Convention some again questioned its efficacy. In 
his statement to the legislature of Maryland, Luther Martin said: “Whether, 
therefore, any laws or regulations of the Congress, any acts of its President or 
other officers, are contrary to, or not warranted by, the Constitution, rests only 
with the judges, who are appointed by Congress, to determine; by whose 
determinations every state must be bound.”42 In the Virginia ratification 
convention, Patrick Henry made a similar charge in a manner that suggests he 
included judicial nullification within the meaning of the word “judiciary”: 
 
The honorable gentleman did our judiciary honor in saying that they had 
firmness to counteract the legislature in some cases. Yes, sir, our judges opposed 
the acts of the legislature. We have this landmark to guide us. They had fortitude 
to declare that they were the judiciary, and would oppose unconstitutional acts. 
Are you sure that your federal judiciary will act thus? Is that judiciary as well 
constructed, and as independent of the other branches, as our state judiciary? 
Where are your landmarks in this government? I will be bold to say you cannot 
find any in it. I take it as the highest encomium on this country, that the acts of 
the legislature, if unconstitutional, are liable to be opposed by the judiciary.43 
 
Also in Virginia, William Grayson, another opponent of the Constitution, 
observed that “If the Congress cannot make a law against the Constitution, I 
apprehend they cannot make a law to abridge it. The judges are to defend it.”44  
This evidence is another example of how original meaning originalism transcends 
disputes between contending political parties in ways original intent originalism 
often cannot. Both sides typically used the same words to describe the same thing.  
I could find no dissent from this interpretation of the “judicial power” in any of 
the ratification debates. 
 
C.  Evidence from Immediately After Ratification 
 
Nor was this conception of judicial power short-lived. Two years after 
ratification of the Constitution, Representative James Madison delivered his 
speech to the first session of the House explaining his proposed amendments to 
the Constitution. In it he asserted the importance of judicial nullification: 
 
                                                          
41 Id. at 157. 
42 Id. at 1:380 (Martin Luther in the Maryland ratification convention, January 27, 1788). 
43 Id. at 3:324-25 (Patrick Henry in the Virginia ratification convention, June 12, 1788) (emphasis 
added). 
44 Id. at 567 (William Grayson in the Virginia ratification convention, June 21, 1788). 
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If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice 
will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they 
will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the 
legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment 
upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of 
rights.45 
 
No one in Congress rose to object to this assertion of “judicial power.” 
Similarly instructive is the understanding of Thomas Jefferson. Because 
Jefferson was in France during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, 
some originalists disparage any reliance upon his views. Yet the very fact that 
Jefferson did not participate in writing or debating the meaning of the 
Constitution makes his reading of the text relevant to an assessment of its original 
public meaning. Added to this is the fact that Jefferson was less of a partisan at 
this time. While he generally supported the Constitution, Jefferson had serious 
reservations about several of its features particularly the absence of a bill of rights 
and rotation in office (what we call today “term limits”). As he put it, “I am 
neither federalist nor antifederalist; …. I am of neither party, nor yet a trimmer 
between parties.”46 
Of special interest are statements in two letters written closely in time to 
James Madison. In the first, a well-known exchange, Jefferson attempts to 
persuade Madison of the value of a bill of rights, which Madison had previously 
disparaged in a letter to Jefferson as mere “parchment barriers.”47 Madison 
contended that “experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those 
occasions when its controul is most needed.”48 In Jefferson’s reply he invoked the 
importance of judicial nullification: 
 
In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you omit one which has 
great weight with me, the legal check which it puts into the hands of the 
judiciary. This is a body, which if rendered independent, and kept strictly to 
their own department merits great confidence for their learning and integrity.49 
 
Jefferson’s affirmation of a judicial power to nullify unconstitutional laws 
is of special significance in light of an earlier objection to the Constitution he had 
made in a letter to Madison: “I like the negative given to the Executive with a 
                                                          
45 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (Joseph Gales ed., 1790). 
46 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 651. (Julian P. Boyd et al., eds., Princeton University 
Press 1950) (Letter to Francis Hopkinson, March 13, 1789) [hereinafter JEFFERSON PAPERS]. 
47 11 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON  297 (University of Chicago Press, 1961) (Letter to Thomas 
Jefferson, October 17, 1788) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS] (“Repeated violations of these 
parchment barriers have been committed by overbearing majorities in every State.”). 
48 Id. 
49 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 45, at 14:659 (Letter to James Madison, March 15, 1789). 
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third of either house, though I should have liked it better had the Judiciary been 
associated for that purpose, or invested with a similar and separate power.”50 A 
judicial “negative,” which the Constitution omitted, like the presidential veto to 
which Jefferson referred, could be exercised for any reason, not just on the ground 
that a law was unconstitutional. From Jefferson’s later exchange with Madison 
asserting the existence of judicial review, we can discern that the omission of 
judicial negative or veto on legislation in the Constitution did not undermine 
Jefferson’s view that the judicial power included a power to nullify 
unconstitutional laws. 
Finally, Madison’s early skepticism of the merits of judicial review 
confirms, rather than undermines, the conclusion that the original meaning of the 
“judicial power” included the power of nullification. In his Observations on the 
“Draught of a Constitution for Virginia”, written within days of his “parchment 
barriers” letter to Jefferson, Madison proposed that vetoed or nullified bills 
reenacted by specified supermajorities in either or both houses should become law 
over the objection of either the executive or the judiciary. “It sd. not be allowed 
the Judges or the Ex to pronounce a law thus enacted, unconstitul. & invalid.”51 
Nevertheless, he acknowledges that in the Constitution then pending ratification, 
only the executive veto may be overridden by a supermajority of both houses. As 
a result, 
 
In the State Constitutions & indeed in the Fedl. one also, no provision is made 
for case of a disagreement in expounding them; and as the Courts are generally 
the last in making their decision, it results to them, by refusing or not refusing to 
execute a law to stamp it with its final character. This makes the Judiciary Dept 
paramount in fact to the Legislature, which was never intended, and can never 
be proper.52 
 
I disagree with Madison here. Being last does not make the judiciary in 
any sense “paramount” but merely equal to the other branches. After all, Congress 
may refuse to enact a law because it deems it to be unconstitutional and, because 
it is first, the bill never reaches the courts who may disagree. This does not render 
Congress paramount to the courts. By the same token, if the president vetoes a bill 
and his veto is sustained, the courts do not get to reverse that decision and uphold 
the bill as constitutional. Instead, in our system, absent a legislative 
supermajoritarian override of a presidential veto, all three branches must concur 
before it is found constitutional. Any one branch may scuttle a law because it 
alone deems it unconstitutional. Of course, as we have seen, by the time he 
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introduced his proposed amendments in the first Congress, Madison came to be 
persuaded by Jefferson (and presumably others) to change his mind on the 
propriety of judicial nullification and he strongly asserted the need for such a 
power. 
Moreover, by bemoaning this feature of the Constitution as written, 
Madison assumes, rather than denies, that the “judicial power” includes the power 
of nullification. Observing so influential a supporter of the Constitution taking 
issue with its propriety here, rather than denying that “judicial power” includes 
the power of nullification, is particularly potent evidence of its original meaning. 
That Madison’s objection confirms the original meaning of the “judicial 
power” is also another vindication of the practicality of original meaning 
originalism and shows its advantages over original intent. While Madison’s intent 
may have changed or conflicted with that of other framers, the meaning of the 
term “judicial power” in the Constitution remained constant and readily 
discernable by historical evidence. This example illustrates, like the statements of 
antifederalists discussed above, how original meaning can be discerned from the 
contemporaneous statements of those who oppose no less than those who support 
a particular provision. 
I have presented so many different statements asserting the existence of 
the power of judicial nullification because there are those today who question 
whether the doctrine was widely held by the founding generation. Like Charles 
Hyneman, they suggest that it was invented in 1803 by John Marshall in Marbury 
v. Madison. Given the weight of the historical evidence (which Hyneman, for 
example, does not discuss), their argument ultimately rests on the fact that the 
power of nullification is not explicit in the Constitution. Rarely do they examine 
the original meaning of “judicial power,” however, choosing to rely instead on the 
“plain meaning” that term has today. 
 
D.  Construing the Power From Other Provisions of the Text 
 
A power of judicial nullification is warranted not only by interpretation of 
the term “judicial power” but also by construing other provisions. According to 
Article III, Section 2: “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution and Laws of the United States…. [and] to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a party.” Second, the 
Supremacy Clause of Article VI provides that “This Constitution, and the Laws of 
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.” 
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These provisions support the following construction: Courts are 
empowered under Article III to decide “all cases … arising under this 
Constitution and Laws of the United States.” When deciding such a case, a court 
is required to apply the laws that are applicable to the case at hand. In cases where 
both the Constitution and a statute apply and the latter is in conflict with the 
former, the court must decide which is a superior authority. The Supremacy 
Clause suggests that the Constitution should take precedence over a statute. (I say 
“suggests,” because the Supremacy Clause speaks of the superiority of the 
Constitution only to state laws and constitutions, not to acts of Congress.) 
Therefore, when the court finds that a statute is in conflict with the Constitution, it 
is bound to obey the Constitution and disregard the statute. 
This was the construction provided by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 
78: 
 
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. 
A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental 
law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning 
of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should 
happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the 
superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other 
words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the 
people to the intention of their agents.53 
 
Why is the Constitution “superior” to an act of Congress? “There is no position 
which depends on clearer principles than that every act of a delegated authority, 
contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No 
legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid.”54 Moreover, 
Hamilton argued: “To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than 
his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the 
people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers 
may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.”55 
Hamilton also rejected the idea that this construction makes the judicial branch 
“superior” to Congress. 
 
Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to 
the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to 
both, and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in 
opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to 
be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their 
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decisions by the fundamental laws rather than by those which are not 
fundamental.56 
 
Hamilton’s argument is undoubtedly a constitutional construction rather 
than a straightforward interpretation of the “judicial power.” This becomes even 
clearer when he bases his analysis on the premise that “The complete 
independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited 
Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain 
specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall 
pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like.”57 If the legislature is 
to be limited in this manner, who besides the courts can police this limitation? 
 
Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through 
the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts 
contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the 
reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.58 
 
Notice that nothing in this rationale for judicial review would empower 
the judiciary to permit Congress to exceed the limits on its powers by changing 
via “interpretation” the written Constitution.  To the contrary, this whole 
justification for judicial review assumes that the Constitution provides written 
limitations that Congress is to follow and judges to enforce.  In short, this 
construction permitting judicial nullification provides still more support for 
originalist interpretation. 
Is Hamilton’s argument for judicial review undermined because it is a 
“mere” construction rather than a straightforward interpretation of the text? 
Hardly. First, it is entirely consistent with evidence of the original meaning of the 
“judicial power.” Second, the contrary position that the Constitution’s silence is to 
be taken as support for congressional supremacy is also a construction. Indeed, 
Hamilton himself appreciated this: 
 
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of 
their own powers and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive 
upon the other departments it may be answered that this cannot be the natural 
presumption where it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the 
Constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed that the Constitution could 
intend to enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of 
their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed 
to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature in order, 
among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their 
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authority.59 
 
In this passage, Hamilton shows that the opposing view is itself one of 
construction, but a construction inferior to the one he advocates. Where the text of 
the Constitution is silent (“where it is not to be collected from any particular 
provisions in the Constitution”) and therefore not subject to straightforward 
interpretation, we ought not adopt a construction (“this cannot be the natural 
presumption”) that Congress is to be “the constitutional judges of their own 
powers and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other 
departments.” Rather, in light of the purposes for which the Constitution was 
adopted and the limitation of power it imposes upon Congress, “It is far more 
rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body 
between the people and the legislature in order, among other things, to keep the 
latter within the limits assigned to their authority.”60 
However, this last formulation that courts were designed “to keep [the 
legislature] within the limits assigned to their authority” is vague. Because 
Hamilton does not add “by nullifying the enforcement of unconstitutional statutes 
that come before them,” his formulation could also be taken to justify a broader 
power to order or compel other branches of the government to keep them “within 
the limits assigned to their authority.” To claim this power for the judiciary would 
be to move beyond judicial nullification to something that could be called judicial 
supremacy. Hamilton, of course, said no such thing and, in context, it is not clear 
that such meaning could fairly be attached to his words. Yet in 1803, this power 
was claimed for the courts in the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison. 
 
III.  JUDICIAL SUPREMACY IS A CONSTRUCTION 
 
We speak today of the power of “judicial review,” not judicial 
nullification. The modern power of judicial review is not limited to refusing to 
enforce an unconstitutional law being applied to an individual a power that is 
warranted by the original meaning of the “judicial power.” Modern judicial 
review also includes a power to command or order other branches of the 
government to follow the judiciary’s interpretation of the Constitution a power 
that is sometimes called “judicial supremacy.” Although I am not entirely 
satisfied with this term,61 I will use it to distinguish between a conception of 
judicial review limited to judicial nullification and one that extends as well to the 
power to command or direct other branches and levels of government to conform 
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to the judiciary’s view of what the Constitution requires. 
The distinction between judicial nullification and judicial supremacy can 
be hard to grasp because nullification seems like a subset of supremacy. A power 
of nullification gives the judiciary the last word on whether a statute is “law” that 
is binding on the individual and this seems like “supremacy,” but the appearance 
is misleading. The explicit division of the government into three departments, 
commonly said to be “coequal” (though this term also does not appear in the text), 
suggests that the judicial branch must reach its own decision on what the 
Constitution requires in cases of conflict between the Constitution and an act of 
Congress when deciding which to enforce. A power of nullification is not one of 
supremacy, but one of judicial equality. Were it absent, the legislative and 
executive branches alone would decide on the constitutionality of their laws. 
Judges would have to merely take their orders. This would render the judiciary 
inferior to the other branches rather than their equal. 
The confusion of judicial nullification with judicial supremacy arises if 
one ignores the proposition that judicial negation is not legislation.62 If Congress 
refuses to enact a statute, perhaps because in its opinion it would be 
unconstitutional, it does not matter if a court would uphold it as constitutional. 
Courts cannot mandate the passage of a statute. On the issue of which statutes to 
enact the legislative power the legislature is “supreme.” Only if the Congress 
enacts a measure because enough of its members believe it to be constitutional (or 
do not care) and the president signs the bill believing it is constitutional (or does 
not care) may the Court have the opportunity to express its opinion on its 
constitutionality. A court’s power to negate unconstitutional legislation renders it 
equal, not superior, to the other branches. 
Just as a power to negate legislation does not imply a power to enact it, 
neither does it imply a judicial power to mandate that the executive branch 
exercise its powers in a particular mode. True, judicial nullification would extend 
to refusing to hold a person liable for disobeying an unconstitutional command of 
the executive branch. Nullification, however, does not include the further power 
to order or “mandate” that someone act in a particular manner or to desist from 
acting in a manner a court finds to be unconstitutional. Whether or not this 
additional power can be justified on the basis of interpretation or construction is a 
separate question. While historical evidence strongly supports the conclusion that 
the original meaning of “judicial power” included the power to nullify, there is 
little if any evidence to support a claim that the original meaning of “judicial 
power” also included a power to command other branches. 
Nor was such a power actually exercised by the Supreme Court in 
Marbury v. Madison.63 This famous case grew out of legislation enacted by a 
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lame-duck Congress dominated by Federalists to create numerous judicial 
positions that could be filled with Federalists by outgoing President Adams before 
the newly elected Republican Thomas Jefferson could assume the presidency. In a 
bizarre twist by today’s lights, all these “midnight commissions” had been sealed 
by John Marshall himself who was not only chief justice, but also the outgoing 
secretary of state and delivered by his brother James. In the haste to seal and 
deliver the commissions, Marbury’s was left behind. At the instruction of 
incoming President Jefferson, James Madison, the incoming secretary of state, 
refused to deliver it. 
Marbury then brought suit in the Supreme Court to issue a writ of 
mandamus to compel the secretary of state “either to deliver the commission, or a 
copy of it from the record.”64 The Court rejected this request because the 
Judiciary Act that authorized the Court to grant writs of mandamus on 
government officials exceeded the powers of Congress and was 
unconstitutional.65 By avoiding the issue of whether a judicial command of this 
kind to the executive branch would exceed the judicial power, Marshall needed 
only to justify in his opinion the judicial power to nullify the Judiciary Act as 
beyond the powers of Congress to enact. Although this conclusion could have 
been well-supported by evidence of the original meaning of the “judicial power,” 
Marshall’s opinion in Marbury is entirely an exercise in constitutional 
constructionand perhaps this absence of originalist justification is the source of 
the cloud over the judicial power of nullification ever since.. 
Marshall begins by recourse to “certain principles, supposed to have been 
long and well established.”66 Among these is the principle that the Constitution is 
“superior law … unchangeable by ordinary means.”67 Although the text says the 
Constitution is superior to state constitutions and statute, it does not say it is 
superior to acts of Congress. Nor does it say that it cannot be changed by ordinary 
means, though this can be implied by the extraordinary mechanisms of 
amendment it provides in Article V. Marshall notes that “all those who have 
framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and 
paramount law of the nation.”68 He concludes from all this that “legislative act 
contrary to the constitution is not law.”69 
Marshall then claims that it is “emphatically the province and duty of the 
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judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular 
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”70 Like Hamilton, 
Marshall notes that “[i]f two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide 
on the operation of each.”71 In such a case, “the court must determine which of 
these conflicting rules governs the case. That is of the very essence of judicial 
duty.”72 Like Hamilton, he finds the answer in the superior authority of the 
Constitution. “If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the 
constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and 
not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.”73 
Marshall emphasizes that to hold otherwise would be to thwart the idea of 
a written constitution and would violate the first principles of this particular 
system of government: 
 
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It 
would declare that an act which, according to the principles and theory of our 
government, is entirely void, is yet in practice, completely obligatory. It would 
declare, that if the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, 
notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be 
giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the same breath 
which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing 
limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.74 
 
Most modern admirers of Marshall and of Marbury fail to realize how the 
“principles and theory of our government” he advances for the power of judicial 
nullification also argue strongly for originalist interpretation.  For only if  the 
Constitution has a meaning independent of the judiciary, and that must remain the 
same until properly changed, does the existence of the “superior” law that is the 
written Constitution justify judges’ nullifying the “ordinary” authority of a statute. 
Not until the end of his opinion does Marshall reinforce his analysis with 
“additional arguments” furnished by inferences drawn from “the peculiar 
expressions of the constitution of the United States.”75 With respect the “judicial 
power,” Marshall argues that it “is extended to all cases arising under the 
constitution.”76 He asks: “Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, 
to say that, in using it, the constitution should not be looked into? That a case 
arising under the constitution should be decided without examining the instrument 
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under which it arises?”77 
Marshall then lists various explicit prohibitions and restrictions in the 
Constitution and concludes, “From these, and many other selections which might 
be made, it is apparent, that the framers of the constitution contemplated that 
instrument, as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature.”78 
In this way, “the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States 
confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written 
constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as 
well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”79 
Notice that none of Marshall’s arguments presented to this point support a 
judicial power to command another coequal branch of government. Indeed, he 
explicitly denies that the court may issue a writ of mandamus to the president 
himself, confining his attention only to whether the secretary of state can be 
compelled to perform a merely “ministerial act.” He concludes that 
 
where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the 
executive, merely to execute the will of the President, or rather they act in cases 
in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can 
be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But 
where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the 
performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who 
considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a 
remedy.80 
 
Later in the opinion Marshall denies that a court may “enquire how the executive, 
or executive officers, perform duties in which they have discretion. Questions, in 
their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the 
executive, can never be made in this court.”81 
Because I do not wish to question whether courts may properly compel 
executive branch officials to perform acts required by law, I shall not rehearse 
here all the arguments made by Chief Justice Marshall on behalf of such a judicial 
power. My point is simply that, unlike the case of judicial nullification, there is 
little or no evidence that such a power can be justified by the original meaning of 
the “judicial power,” and Marshall offered none. Further, because it held that the 
power was improperly granted to the Court by Congress, any suggestion in 
Marbury that a court has power to mandate behavior is dicta. 
Marshall’s dicta that courts may sometimes have such a power is a 
construction, rather than an interpretation, of the Constitution, though this is not 
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to say that it is necessarily improper.  Also a constriction is the contrary position 
favored, for example, by President Jefferson who was of the opinion that federal 
courts “cannot issue a mandamus to the President or legislature, or to any of their 
officers.”82 Although the writ existed at common law, “the constitution [controls] 
the common law in this particular.”83 Because he was speaking of judicial 
supremacy, not judicial nullification, Jefferson was not contradicting his earlier 
endorsement of judicial review as some have charged.84  To resolve this dispute 
would require an inquiry into whether a constructive judicial power of mandamus 
sometimes or always conflicts with the original meaning of the text and, if not, 
whether such a power enhances or detracts from constitutional legitimacy.85  I 
express no opinion on this issue here. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We are now in a position to understand why the Constitution did not 
contain a passage reading something like: “The Supreme Court, and such inferior 
courts as may be established by Congress, shall have power to nullify a Law 
enacted by Congress and signed by the President if the Law is unconstitutional.”  
The evidence from the Constitutional Convention and from the state ratification 
conventions is overwhelming that the original public meaning of the “judicial 
power” included the power to nullify unconstitutional laws. In contrast, because 
the “executive power” did not include the inherent power to veto legislation, it 
had to be added expressly.  So too did the legislative override. 
The evidence found in these crucial records of public meaning is so 
consistent that the discovery of a few counterexamples would not undermine this 
conclusion.  Nevertheless, I found no such counterexamples in my search through 
these records (though one never can be completely sure about what one has 
missed).  Will the evidence marshaled here end all further controversy over 
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whether judicial review is authorized by the original meaning of the text?  My 
tongue-in-cheek rhetoric to one side, longstanding academic debates are rarely 
settled so cleanly.  Still, one of the virtues of original meaning originalism is that 
those seeking to dissent from this conclusion must go out and find direct evidence 
of original meaning in the form of statements from the conventions (or, less 
meaningfully, from elsewhere) to the contrary.  Speculation under the guise of 
historical “context” or counterfactual channeling the framers will not do.  I look 
forward to examining the fruits of their labor.  
